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CS Talk
May 10, 2012
10:30 a.m., AKW 200
Host: Bryan Ford
Speaker: Ariel Feldman, Princeton
Title: Privacy and Integrity in the Untrusted Cloud
Abstract: For a myriad of user-facing applications from
word processing and calendaring to social networking, cloud deployment
is becoming increasingly popular. Cloud services are attractive because
they offer availability, reliability, global accessibility, and convenience
that desktop applications cannot match. Unfortunately, these benefits
come at the cost of having to trust the service provider with the confidentiality
and integrity of one’s data. Private data stored with cloud providers
could be leaked to malicious outsiders and insiders or turned over to
government agencies, potentially without warrants. Furthermore, a malicious
or compromised cloud provider could corrupt users’ data or even
equivocate, showing different users divergent views of the system’s
state.
In this talk, I will present two systems that make it possible to benefit
from a centralized cloud provider without having to trust it with the
privacy and integrity of users’ data. In both systems, the provider’s
servers see only encrypted data and cannot deviate from correct execution
without detection. The first system, SPORC, allows concurrent, low-latency
editing of shared state, permits disconnected operation, and supports
dynamic access control even in the presence of concurrency. The second,
Frientegrity, provides strong defenses against server equivocation as
well as dynamic access control that scale to the demands of a large social
networking service. Both of these systems explore what is possible when
the confidentiality and integrity of users’ data depends on the
security of their own cryptographic keys, and not on a service provider’s
good intentions.
Bio: Ariel J. Feldman is a Ph.D. candidate in computer science
at Princeton University whose research focuses on systems security and
applied cryptography. His recent work has been aimed at developing practical
cloud-based systems that protect the confidentiality and integrity of
users’ data by design rather than through promises and legal contracts.
Previously, he has worked on improving the security of electronic voting
systems and disk encryption.

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