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Internal |
CS Talk Abstract: Cake cutting is a common metaphor for the
division of a heterogeneous divisible good. There are numerous papers
that study the problem of fairly dividing a cake; a small number of them
also take into account self-interested agents and consequent strategic
issues, but these papers focus on fairness and consider a strikingly weak
notion of truthfulness. In this paper we investigate the problem of cutting
a cake in a way that is truthful, Pareto-efficient, and fair, where for
the first time our notion of dominant strategy truthfulness is the ubiquitous
one in social choice and computer science. We design both deterministic
and randomized cake cutting mechanisms that are truthful and fair under
different assumptions with respect to the valuation functions of the agents.
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