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Alan J. Perlis Lecture Series
February 5, 2008
4:00 p.m., AKW 200
Sign
up to meet with speaker.
Speaker: Eva
Tardos, Cornell University
Title: Bargaining and Trading in Networks
Abstract: Network games play a fundamental
role in understanding behavior in many domains, ranging from communication
networks through markets, to social networks. In this talk, we will consider
bargaining and trading in a network setting, where a set of agents have
the opportunity to choose whom they want to bargain or trade with, along
the edges of a graph representing social-network relations or trade routes.
In the bargaining context, we analyze a model arising in network exchange
theory, which can be viewed as a direct extension of the well-known Nash
bargaining solution for two player games. This model is known to be surprisingly
effective at picking up even subtle differences in bargaining power that
have been observed experimentally on small examples, but it has remained
an open question to characterize the values taken by this solution on
general graphs, or to find an efficient means to compute it. In the trading
context, we consider a model with traders, where traders set prices strategically,
and then buyers and sellers react to the prices they are offered. We characterize
the outcomes in both models, thus providing graph-theoretic basis for
quantifying the players’ relative amounts of power in the network.
We also show that the outcomes are socially optimal and can be computed
in polynomial time. Joint work with Jon Kleinberg, Larry Blume, and David
Easley.

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