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Faculty Recruit Talk
April 1, 2008
10:30 a.m., AKW 200
Sign
up to meet with speaker.
Speaker: Nickolai
Zeldovich, Stanford University
Title: Building secure systems from buggy code with
information flow control
Abstract: Today, computer security resembles an arms race: the
bad guys constantly find new ways to break in, and being safe requires
staying one step ahead of them in cutting off avenues of attack. This
strategy is simply too risky and too expensive in the long run. In this
talk, I will argue that we need to address security at a much more fundamental
level, and I will show how re-designing operating systems, network protocols,
and hardware can provide a solid foundation for building applications
in a way that eliminates or radically reduces vulnerabilities.
Much of the challenge in building secure applications stems from the fact
that real systems are constantly evolving, and that most programmers are
not security-conscious, resulting in code rife with bugs that cause security
vulnerabilities. Instead of trying to fix all code, this talk will argue
that we should protect data, by controlling how it can move through the
system. The key insight is that data protection cuts across layers: any
piece of data in an application can also be viewed as memory or files
by the OS, or as physical pages by the hardware. Consequently, even data
in buggy applications can be protected by the OS or by hardware, despite
the latter two being at a much lower level of abstraction.
In particular, I will first describe how a low-level information flow
control mechanism can be provided by a small OS kernel, hardware, or network
protocol, and then show how the same mechanism can be used throughout
the system to enforce security policies ranging from those traditionally
found in Unix to those that can ensure the privacy of user data in a web
server built from largely untrusted code.
Bio: Nickolai Zeldovich is a postdoc at Stanford University,
where he recently received his Ph.D. Previously he received M.Eng. and
S.B. degrees from MIT. His research interests are in security, operating
systems, and networking.

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