"Revenue"

Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders

We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items. Providing a …

Yang Cai, Ziyun Chen, Jinzhao Wu

Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all …

Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao

A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., …

Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg

Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multidimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary - …

Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg